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Assessing the effect of Alhurra 
Anne Marie Baylvuny 
The current US administration has identified the Lebanese Islamist group Hizbullah 
as a key threat, and ~e group's media as a source of increasing anti-Americanism. 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld blamed Al Jazeera, the leading Arabic 
language.news station, for encouraging Islamism by broadcasting beheadings of 
hostages tn Iraq, a charge the station denies (Smallman 2005). ln President George 
Bush's State of the Union address in 2004, he focused on Arab television stations 
he claimed are responsible for 'hateful propaganda' against the US, distorting news 
and showing explicit images producing anti-Americanism (Cochrane 2004b). Al 
Manar, a satellite television service launched by the Lebanese Hizbullah, is one 
of those stations. The US maintains that al Manar is anti-Semitic and promotes 
hatred, and lists its sponsor Hizbullah as a terrorist group. 
To counter what is viewed as the promotion of anti-Americanism, hate and 
terrorism, the administration banned al Manar from American airwaves in 
December 2004 (Yadav 2005). The US launched its own television station, Alhurra, 
to compete with messages from Arab media outlets generally, and promote the 
American point of view. Here is a clear case of an American attempt to counter the 
ideology associated with terrorism. Are these efforts likely to succeed, winning 
the hearts and minds of Arab and Muslim TV viewers? To answer this question, an 
analysis of Hizbullah's appeal is necessary. What messages is the organization's 
station actually carrying, and with which constituencies do they resonate? How 
does banning the station affect its credibility? ln this study I analyse al Manar 's 
ideology and link it to its bases of support. l then examine the American actions 
to counter this ideological influence, and how those attempts are received in the 
Arah world. 1 
Instead of promoting the American perspective in the Middle East, the new 
US satellite station has become largely irrelevant, serving mainly to demonstrate 
the supposed danger of Arab media. Ironically, the launching of the US station 
has added to the popularity and credibility of al Manar. Alhurra cannot replace 
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s~tions such as al Manar, even in the absence of a US credibility problem in the 
Middle East. As social mobilization theories have demonstrated, perspective or 
frames of reterence must resonate with the audience to be accepted; promotion of 
a viewpoint is not unequivocally received and believed. The reception depends on 
commumty outlooks, values and identity, to name a few. Alhurra communicates 
values consistent with the American way of life, highlighting the glamorous 
side of globalization and identification with Israel, for example, while al Manar 
speaks to the struggling middle class, promotes community values and respect, 
and highlights the plight of Arab victims. Such a perspective, formerly identified 
as third worldism, is not unique to al Manar or Arab media, but finds parallels in 
local and community movements worldwide. 
Al Manar has indeed moderated its coverage, not in response to competition 
from the lJS station, but through factors unconnected tu US actions. As 
the opportunity for participation in Lebanon's political arena increased for 
Hizbullah, al Manar became progressively more national and Lebanon-focused, 
marginalizing discourse aimed at a supra-national Shi'a or Muslim community. 
With the prospect ofHizbullah gaining a cabinet position with the 2005 elections, 
the station's more extreme rhetoric became muted. This finding has far-reach.ing 
implications, demonstrating a non-confrontational method of mitigating an 
organization's radical stances. ' 
The problem: al Maoar's media ideology 
The Lebanese lslarnist party Hizbullah3 began its television station al Manar (the 
Lighthouse) in 1991 broadcasting locally in Lebanon. ln May 2000, al Manar 
began transmitting by satellite . Al Manar is generally available throughout the 
Arab world on satellite, and in Lebanon over land. The station is banned in Europe 
and the United States. Al Manar has bureaux and correspondents around the world, 
and is most famous for its coverage of Hizbullah operations against Israel's army 
in southern Lebanon, through reporters 'embedded' with Hizbullah troops. Polls 
list al Manar as one of the top four news stations in the Middle East, particularly 
for news on Palestine.' The station identifies itself as 'qanat al muqawama', the 
station of the resistance, and has been labelled 'resistance media' by one Arab 
editor (Jorisch 2004a: 23) . It is viewed as one of the new, politically independent 
media (Sharabi 2003). Al Manar won the most awards of all competitors at the 8th 
Cairo Television and Radio Festival. 
Al Manar is funded by Hizbullah. Though precise costs or amounts are not 
known. one source put the annual expenses of the station at $10--15 million (Abu-
Fadil 2004; Jorisch 2004a: xiii). Funding from Iran dropped dramatically after 
the end of the Lebanese civil war, the party's participation in elections. and the 
death of Ayatollah Khomaini. Meanwhile, Hizbullah has increased its revenue 
from non-Iranian Shi'a and Lebanese sources. Revenue comes from expatriate 
remittances, donations and tithes.5 
Arab satellite television does not generally subsist through advertising; stations 
are politically geared and :funded.6 Particularly in Lebanon. each major political 
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trend has its own station. which at times the leader personally finances. While 
ads arc of secondary importance. they indicate the market where the station is 
popular, the most important of which is the Gulf. Al Manar rdies particularly little 
on advertising. With a mix of global and local supporters, al Manar is theoretically 
attractive to advertisers. However, the station reportedly turns down 90 per cent of 
potential advertisers due to the violation of its standards. It declines commercials 
for alcohol, tobacco, or ones in which women are presented as objects for sale or 
temptation (Abu-Fadil 2004). Advertising on the station is also less appealing to 
Gulf advertisers for political reasons. since Shi ·a are seen as a separate community.7 
Until 2004. ads were broadcast only on the land-based station. Large American and 
European companies advertised here, until a scandal brought this to the attention 
of the US Congress. Subsequently, American and many European advertisers 
withdrew (Jorisch 2004b). Currently, advertisements on al Manar are infrequent 
and few. airing mainly in prime time, for local and regionally-based goods. 
Al Manar contains a variety of programming. Some is overtly ideological, 
communicating Hizbullah ·s viewpoint. The bulk of programming, however, is 
either unremarkable, consistent with programmes on Arab stations in general, 
or modemisationist and non-confessional, promoting the rule of law, democratic 
participation, and education of viewers. This latter aspect may surprise those 
accustomed to viewing Hizbullah as a fount for hatred (Jorisch 2004a), but 
is wholly consistent with the organization's domestic role in Lebanon. The 
station advocates community, developmentalism. the Palestinian cause. and 
maintenance of the Islamic resistance (Hizbullah). It stands against materialism, 
Israeli aggressive actions, the US in Iraq, and confessionalism in the Lebanese 
political system. It emphasizes unemployment, corruption, and the need to cross 
confessions and join together as a nation. 
Common to other Arab media are entertainment programmes and serials, many 
of which al Manar purchases from Egypt and Syria. Comedies such as 'Ashna wa 
shufna' , and historically situated series, set during Ottoman times, are examples 
of this. The station also airs sports shows. Many children 's programmes resemble 
public television elsewhere in the world. There are cartoons, computer-generated 
'Teletubbies'-style shows, and puppet shows that warn against smoking. Other 
programmes for children include American movies such as Rain Man and Disney 
cartoons (Lancaster 2005). 
Numerous programmes seek to educate, paralleling Western public broadcasting 
such as PBS. This includes scientific interviews on meteors and geology, new 
technology from the US, and 'Discovery ' -style programmes on animals, geared 
toward the needs of the constituency (such as new cow-milking technology, for 
example). Histories of Arab countries are broadcast. Public service-oriented spots 
promote the rule of law, admonishing viewers to 'Obey the law; do not break the 
law'. During elections in Lebanon, spots focused on the importance of voting 
and Lebanese unity. The elections were spun as an affinnation of democracy, a 
message to the US, counter to the interests of Bush. the US and Israel. 'Your 
vote protects Lebanon', a spot stated ('sawtak b~vahmi Lubnan ' ). Another spot 
advertised 'wihda Lubnan', or one Lebanon. The power of the Shi ' a community 
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was reiterated, in both a get-out-the-vote perspective and one which sought to 
remind those elected of the Shi'a role in their victory. 
Al Manar broadcasts popular and relevant household progranunes. Mornings, 
after the news, are devoted to a weekly theme, usually geared toward women. 
One week discussed child rearing, how both mother and father have roles in child 
sociali:zation. Professors discussed their psychological perspectives on the family 
and children. Another tackled the problem of what to do when a child does not 
want to go to school. Other episodes discussed plant arranging, summer fruit, and 
new women writers. One segment hosted a local clothes designer who utilizes 
intricate sequin patterns in her clothes. 
Segments of another programme discussed ditliculties a family could have and 
proposed solutions. The segments aided parents in socialization tactics for their 
children, teaching them to keep their own problems away from their children, 
how to talk to children to prevent them from misbehaving, and emphasizing the 
importance of education for children, equating it to alleviating the suffering of 
the community. One segment discussed women's rights in Islam. Another showed 
children asking their parents to help poor families, as was done in the Prophet's 
time. Another segment stressed the centrality of the martyr's children and their 
education, seen as role models for others. 
Community solidarity and the need for cooperation are emphasized. One series, 
'Ahl al medina' (the People of the City) emphasized the need of individuals for 
each other, and their inability to live an individualistic life alone. These community 
values and traditions are also linked to the resistance. We are all responsible for 
our brothers and community - do not forget the martyrs and resistance fighters, 
one spot states. Others tie the culture of the simple, traditional Lebanese people to 
support for the resistance. A spot shows children playing, men smoking arghileh 
(water pipe), women cooking in traditional pots, and Lebanese celebrations before 
showing the resistance. Town hall type programmes are also produced and aired 
by the station, such as 'Nafitha "ala al mujtama "' (window on the community). 
People gather and express their opinions on particular social problems and other 
topics. 
Further, this community is not limited to the Shi' a, but includes other confess-
ional groups in Lebanon and the Palestinians there. According to an official at the 
Lebanese Ministry oflnformation, al Manar compared favourably to other stations 
which merely advertised their own political viewpoint, excluding alternative trends 
from airtirne .8 Al Manar remains neutral in these ·crossfire'-type programmes, 
he stated, in order to increase its viewership. Christians and subjects involving 
Christians were treated respectfully. a fact noted by interviewees. One historical 
programme centred on Mary, the mother of Jesus. 
Surprisingly, al Manar is not overtly religious compared to other religiously-
affiliated stations, according to audience opinion. Religious interpretations and 
discussions are minimal. Al Manar reiterates its religious identity mainly through 
broadcasting the call to prayer, and like other stations includes more religious 
programming during Ramadan. Religious-educational game shows centre around 
children 's knowledge of the Quran. One show involved Palestinian and Lebanese 
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children averaging 8-12 years of age, over half of whom were girls, competing 
to recite verses. 
Local values also cater to the humble or struggling social classes, demonstrating 
the positive aspects of a non-materialistic lifestyle. Programmes demonstrate 
women's lives and the. household, as the good mother rejects commercialism and 
Western culture. In one series, a girl envies the conspicuous consumption apparent 
in Beirut, moving to work in an expensive boutique and date boys. Eventually, 
she recognizes the error of her ways and returns home to work in community-
valued endeavours, regretting the time spent envying the possessions and lifestyle 
of others . A public role for women is promoted within an Islamic framework. At 
lca..<;t half of the announcers and programme hosts are women, all veiled (with the 
hijab, the scarf covering the hair). However, not all the women appearing on the 
shows are veiled, and commercials (on the local station) show women unveiled. 
Further, professional women are interviewed for their specialties. 
The community is defended by Hizbullah, and the importance of the 
resistance's work is reiterated. Resistance against potential Israeli incursion is 
equated to watchfulness, and Hizbullah is the vanguard of protection for the 
sovereignty of the Lebanese state. This is exemplified by the spot 'protection of 
the resistance is pro\ection of Lebanon' (himaya al muqawama. himaya lubnan) . 
Spots highlight resistance activities, demonstrating Hizbullah soldiers in hiding 
watching the border with Israel. ' Bil-mursaad' (in the lookout) states that no one 
can approach the border without being detected. A bird is shown getting near 
the border, it is trapped, and then the remains of soldiers' uniforms are seen. 
Another reiterates that 425 resolutions attempted to get Israel out of Lebanon: 
one resolution succeeded in the task -- that of al muqawama (the resistance). 
Another touts the resistance as safety for the generations. Spots demonstrate the 
sacrifice of resistance fighters for the safety of the Lebanese. In one, a woman 
is shown sleeping at night, a second woman sitting next to her baby sleeping in 
the crib. All eyes are sleeping, but there are eyes watching out for your safety 
- the eyes of al muqawama, as resistance soldiers are shown watching the Israeli 
border at night. Overall, the messages and ideology mirror those used by armies 
in other parts of the globe, touting the suffering of the soldiers on the citizens' 
behalf, pride in resistance actions, and soldiers' own self-respect earned through 
military service. 
Other shows for children focus on and reiterate the need for a resistance. 
'Asdiqa · al-manar' (Friends of al Manar) is a game show set as a pretend war 
game, with youngsters 10-15 years old fighting with fake weapons (guns, 
grenades, swords, arrows) against an enemy that appears Western. The fighters 
maintain a sense of community, enacting a form of brotherhood, sharing food 
and bonding. The series 'Fatat al muqawam al Quds' (Jerusalem Resistance Boy) 
involves a young fatherless boy (a recurring theme) who wants to find his father 
who went missing in a war. To do so, he learns to fly planes, starting with paper 
airplanes, then with flying school lessons. Unable to find his father, he joins the 
military - Hizbullah 's Islamic Resistance - and tries to recruit his friends to join. 
Religion is not mentioned. 
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Al Manar's main claim to fame is its broadcast ofHizbullah military operations 
against the Israeli army in southern Lebanon. Episodes of Israeli troops killed 
there were initially shown on al Manar (Charara and Domont 2004: 170), and 
later aired on Israeli TV (Dellios 2000). To reinforce its victories, mainly for its 
own constituency, the station's psychological campaign 'Who's next?' shows 
Israeli casualties and a blank space for future soldiers (Hamzeh 2004). The station 
broadcasts some spots in Hebrew, aimed at demoralizing the Israelis. but this 
campaign was arguably more important for the group 's domestic constituency, 
providing evidence ofHizbullah 's activism in fighting the enemy. Segments recount 
Israel's incursions into Lebanese and Arab soil, and Hizbullah's responses. 
Coverage of Israel and the Palestinians is central in the station's news also." 
Interviews include those in lslamist groups such as Hamas, from which some 
. observers conclude that al Manar is a voice for terrorism. The Palestinian right of 
return in international law is another topic in this vein. Al Manar is perceived to 
be speaking out for the Palestinians, the 'underdog'. against the Israeli oppressor, 
and airs news and viewpoints not seen on other stations. Programmes highlight the 
historical actions of Israelis, seeking to uncover their crimes and terrorist actions, 
such as the Spider House, Terrorist-Zionist Crimes, and others (Hamzeh 2004). 
One spot states, amid dramatic music, 'al Qudsfi khatr' (Jerusalem is in danger). 
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is highlighted in al Manar's lighter 'human 
interest' programming as well. Game shows such as 'al Muhimma' (the mission) 
have contestants trying to enter Jerusalem and answer historical questions, mainly 
regarding Israel and resistance organizations in other countries. In two series ('al 
'Aidun' and 'Yatathakkarnn '), Palestinian elders recount oral histories, telling 
stories of village life in the homeland (Khalili 2004: 17). Another programme 
reunited a Palestinian family who moved from Beirut to Gaza with the members 
of the family who stayed in Lebanon. Along with pictures and direct interviews, 
the interviewer discussed how the individuals remember their family, family 
stories were recounted, and they discussed the pain of ghurbeh (being distant) 
and the feeling of hanin (nostalgia) for family. One show, for which the station 
received fierce international criticism, focused on the Jews in history, called 'The 
Diaspora' or 'al Shattat', and contained significant factual inaccuracies (Harb 
and Leenders 2005: 182). This was a Syrian-made drama that the station said it 
purchased quickly without viewing the entire series in advance. Whether this is 
true or not is less important than the station's realization that airing the series was 
a mistake (Charara and Domont 2004: 171 ). 
Internationally, al Manar follows American domestic and foreign politics 
closely. Regarding US positions on Lebanon and Syria, one spot states, 'This is 
how the US deals with UN resolution 1559' (calling for Syria to withdraw from 
Lebanon), while depicting a man holding a large wooden stick the size of a bat, 
tapping it hard against his hand, menacing and ready to strike. This is followed 
by another scene, with the words 'and this is how the US treats UN resolutions 
regarding Israel' . The screen shows a man picking the petals of a daisy and states: 
it applies, it does not apply, it applies, and so on. As in alternative reporting in 
the West, the Bush administration is seen as anti-Muslim, and Christian Zionists 
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as behind much of those policies. The station distinguishes between Christianity 
('true' Christianity) and the actions of Zionist Christians. Jewish interests are seen 
as powerful in determining US policy and electoral outcomes. Israel is viewed 
as behind the banning of al Manar in France, and American reports from the 
Congressional Research Service are used to support the a~sertion of AIPAC (pro-
Israeli) and Saudi funding of American elections. 
Potential threats against the Arab and Muslim worlds are reported. The station 
communicates the idea that Israel is hegemonic in the region, tightly connected to 
the US. and that Israel and the US want a weakened Lebanon and Syria, unable 
to resist Israel's actions. Iraq was targeted to fragment the country, not make it 
sovereign. American troops in Iraq are referred to as 'the American occupation 
army'. Details of torture, indictments and alleged rapes by American troops 
are reported. and more importantly, the station quotes American media reports 
regarding those issues. Further, while the US emphasizes the threat facing it in 
Iraq to mobilize domestic support, al Manar spins this same fact as a positive, 
demonstrating the power of the opposition. 
In addition, al Manar programming highlights any mistakes or faux pas of 
the US. It emphasites that Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib are not being discussed 
in the US nor are those responsible punished. Lawsuits and problems about the 
Pentagon that are reported in the US press are carried by the station. lmport~ntly, 
American moves to correct problems are also reported, such as the Congress10nal 
meeting to research events at Guantanamo Bay. Flaws in the US are emphasized, 
such as discrimination against Blacks, the situation of American Indians, and 
slavery. Spots and filler segments highlight negative actions of the United States. 
One historical piece, ·WAR', focuses on US invasions of other countries. Another 
shows UN proposals favourable to Arabs, and the US veto of them. 
In other foreign policy issues, Syria is praised for its support of Hizbullah's 
fight against Israel, and the relationship between Syria and ~ebanon _is viewed 
a~ complementary. The Saudis are condemned for not financially helpmg others 
and being corrupt. Further, the station is not a mere mouthpiece for Iran. Al 
Manar actively discussed and critiqued the new Iranian president, refuting the 
idea that he would, or indeed could, segregate the sexes in public. Civil society, 
including numerous women in parliament, is too developed to return to policies 
characteristic of previous harsh times. 
ln sum. al Manar does not conform to stereotypes of it (or of Hizbullah) that it 
marginalizes women or injects religion into all its programming. On the contrary, 
the station highlights practical problems of women and solutions proposed by 
them. The overwhelming majority of children's, entertainment. scientific and 
technological programmes are identical to those on any other station, American 
or otherwise. Where programmes differ in ways peculiar to the station, they 
communicate an alternative concept of the common good which relies heavily on 
the local community. a perspective the American station docs not offer. 
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The US response: launching Alhurra and banning 
alManar 
The US response to al Manar was to ban it entirely from the US and to promote its 
own channel, Alhurra (the Free One), to compete for Arab audiences. 10 The station 
was intended to move 'the people of the region away from extremism and violence 
and toward democracy and freedom' (Sefsaf 2004), countering the presumed 
negative image portrayed by Arab media stations. A triad of new US media were 
launched to this end in the Arab world: a satellite TV station, a radio station called 
Radio Sawa, and 'Hi' magazine, which together are publicly funded through a 
half a billion dollar grant to the Broadcasting Board of Governors, producers of 
the Voice of America. Alhurra is the commercial-free satellite station launched on 
Valentine's Day 2004. The station was allocated $102 million start-up funding by 
Congress (Rugh 2005), $62 million for the first year, and $40 million more for an 
Iraq-specific station (McCarthy 2004). Fifty-two million dollars were proposed 
for the station in 2005, and $652 million requested for international broadcasting 
in 2006. 11 
Alhurra currently broadcasts only to the Middle East, and is less available than 
al Manar. It is available in Jordan, Iraq and Egypt for those owning satellites. 
However, some satellite providers do not offer it and there is heavy pressure on 
them to keep the station off (Cochrane 2004b ). Poll results on Alhurra, apart from 
those reported to Congress,11 demonstrate the lack of interest and trust in the 
station by the Arab viewing public. A survey by Zogby International conducted 
by Shibley Telhami in June 2004 across a number of Arab countries found no one 
turned to Alhurra as a first choice for news; a small amount, 3 .8 per cent, picked it 
as a second choice (Wise 2005). A Palestinian poll found only l. I per cent watched 
Alhurra, whereas over 58 per cent viewed al Jazeera, 12 per cent al Manar, and 
10 per cent al Arabiyya. Gallup's poll concluded that 6 per cent oflraqis watched 
Alhurra in the previous week. A survey by the Arab Advisors Group found fewer 
Egyptians watched the station (3 per cent) than viewed BBC World (5 per cent) 
or the government's Nile News (9 per cent) (ibid.). A survey of satellite users 
in greater Cairo found that most viewers (over 64 per cent) felt Alhurra was not 
trustworthy as a news source; college-educated viewers trusted the station a bit 
more than those with only a high school diploma (Arab Advisors Group 2005). 
In comparison, almost 86 per cent felt al Jazeera was trustworthy, and almost 67 
per cent felt CNN was trustworthy (ibid.). Tellingly, only 8 per cent of Alhurra's 
small viewing public deemed the station's coverage trustworthy (Wise 2005). The 
polls that indicate higher viewership for the station also show its irrelevance ~s 
a news source. One poll indicates that around a quarter of Jordanians and Saudis 
watch Alhurra at least once a week but it is not a primary source of news for them 
(McCarthy 2004). 
Direct interviews confirmed the conclusions of pollsters. The most common 
audience reaction to Alhurra was indifference. It is seen as just another station, 
similar to al Manar in that neither is commercially supported, and neither can 
claim to be unbiased: both explicitly seek to communicate a message funded by 
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political considerations. 'What's different about Alhurra? Why don't you ask what 
al Manar and Alhurra have in common?' one educated woman asked. Throughout 
Lebanon and Jordan, people overwhelmingly believe that Alhurra shows them 
what the US wants them to know. Young Iraqis living in Jordan have hope in the 
US plan for Iraq and therefore watch Alhurra to see the vision of their future. 
The few positive opinions of Alhurra mentioned only the entertainment coverage 
or the cultural interview programmes. In Beirut, while some Christians watch 
the station, recent interviews indicate that for the overwhelming majority of the 
population in the Muslim areas Alhurra is 'all but dead'. If Alhurra succeeds in 
obtaining a serious audience, it will be among the upper class and those already 
pro-American. 
The US station is accused of preaching. condescension and cultural 
inappropriateness (Sefsaf 2004 ). Its name, the 'free one', assumes the traditional 
US stance of representing the better society but contradicts its actual journalistic 
nature ( Kuttab 2004 ). Owned by a government and under strict guidelines regarding 
its coverage, critics argue that it cannot be free. The imposed limitations include not 
airing interviews with leaders of terrorist groups, such as the Taliban, or negative 
aspects of the coalition presence in Iraq (Sefsaf 2004). Similarly neglected are 
major issues of concern to1Arab viewers, such as the Abu Ghraib scandal and 
the plight of the Palestinians (Cochrane 2004a). The spin of events also differs. 
People are not 'martyred' but 'killed', and the station does not call terrorism 'so-
called terrorism ' as other Arab stations do. Further, the common greeting used by 
Arab channels, 'al sallamu 'alaykum', viewed as religious, is avoided in Alhurra, 
whose hosts instead say 'welcome back' (Wise 2005). Ironically, this last aspect 
fuels perceptions that the US is against the region's religion. 
ln fact, the station 's news coverage differs markedly from other stations in 
the area. Breaking news is particularly problematic for the station, adding to the 
problems in becoming a news source in times of crisis. Alhurra was broadcasting 
a cooking show when Sheikh Yassin was assassinated by Israel, and in contrast 
to all the Arab television stations, Alhurra remained in the kitchen. The others 
switched to cover the breaking news. The station's director later admitted this 
was a mistake (McCarthy 2004). Similarly, the Cairo Khan el Khalili terrorist 
incident that killed three tourists was not covered for over an hour after other 
stations had switched (Wise 2005). The station's heavy reliance on pre-produced, 
Western and sub-titled programmes has been addressed recently, with the addition 
of more local material, specifically town-hall type debates and coverage geared to 
the elections in Iraq, Palestine and the US. 
Coverage is heavily weighted toward statements by American officials. During 
my research, President Bush's speeches were covered extensively, occasionally 
taking up most of news broadcast time. Interviews with American officials about 
American events were translated and shown in Arabic. American military officials 
in lraq were interviewed when events occurred in Iraq, and Israeli officials spoke 
on events in southern Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority. Reporting a clash 
between Hizbullah and the Israeli army in Southern Lebanon, newscasters stated 
that the Israelis knew it was coming, that it was not a surprise to them. This is 
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important since the knowledge and competence of the Israeli army have been 
discredited by its unsuccessful occupation of the area. Coverage of the military 
skirmish focused on the lsraeli side, showing Israeli soldiers preparing for war. 
Newscasters discussed the 'message' that Israel was attempting to send. This 
contrasts with al Manar's coverage of the same events. which focused on the Arab 
perspective of the event, the Palestinians and Lebanese. 
The US point of view is communicated clearly through news shows and 
promotional spots. Alhurra's promotional spots emphasize elections and protest 
in the Arab world. One spot ends with King Abdallah of Jordan saying in English 
that 'we' are making the Middle East a better place, after pictures of the Syrian 
President Bashar al Asad and Syrian troops leaving Lebanon. Other spots show 
Iraqis voting and Egyptian and Lebanese protestors (ibid.). News talk shows are 
preoccupied with establishing the authoritarian nature of Iran, demonstrating 
the accomplishments of professional, Westernized Arab women, and refuting 
complaints about corruption in Morocco, for ex.ample. Corruption is central to 
Islamist grievances, a cause presumably common to the US. 
By far the station 's most popular shows are its non-news coverage, including 
travel, documentary, fashion, cinema and music programmes. 13 lt also has 
interviews with local fashion designers and writers. Hollywood events such as the 
Golden Globes and the Emmy awards are broadcast (live), along with baseball 
and football games to draw more male viewers. But the increase in such coverage 
is criticized by the Broadcast Board of Governors, the oversight body for Alhurra, 
since the station was intended for news. Mouafac Harb, the station's director, 
defends the fashion progranunes, saying that people in the Middle East should see 
that there is a 'grand and beautiful world' beyond their borders (Wise 2005). 
Alhurra is faced with what one writer described as an 'existential' problem 
(Rugh 2005), which results in the station either appearing to be the old-&1yle 
government-sponsored propaganda, or evading Congress 's dictates. It cannot be 
critical of the US due to its structure and organizational funding, but to effectively 
draw viewers from other stations for news coverage it must cover a variety of 
viewpoints as the others do, which inevitably involves criticism of US policies. 
Currently, the station treads the line between the two, aided partly by Congress's 
inability to directly monitor its broadcasts which are in Arabic (ibid.). 
Added to the entrance of Alhurra was the banning of al Manar. The campaign in 
the US and Europe to remove al Manar from satellite stations began with an opinion 
piece in the Los Angeles Times in October 2002. The piece accused American 
companies who advertised on the station of promoting terrorism (Jorisch 2003b ). 
PepsiCo, Procter and Gamble, and Western Union were cited as advertisers on al 
Manar's local broadcasts (the satellite broadcast at the time was commercial-free). 
This was followed by a letter to Congress to put pressure on these companies, 
using the opinion piece as support. The advertisers pulled out, and pressure to 
ban transmission of the station increased. The station similarly drew ire from 
groups in Europe. The group having agreed not to air messages inciting hatred, 
the French Audiovisual Council granted it a licence, with a warning to stick to its 
word (aljazeera.net 2004a). However, it was indeed banned from French airwaves 
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and European ones in general, followed quickly by an American banning of the 
station in December 2004 (Drees 2004 ). 
The immediate reaction to the banning of al Manar in Lebanon was defiance. 
In response to France 's ban, 50 cable operators in Beirut halted the French 
station TVS (Smallman 2005). The Lebanese Minister of Information declared 
it censorship of any opposition to Israel. and students demonstrated in support of 
al Manar (aljazeera.net 2004b). The banning was criticized by Reporters Without 
Borders, who warned against confusing anti-Israeli positions with the fight against 
terrorism (Smallman 2005). Al Manar voluntarily stopped broadcasting several 
days before the ban was to take effect, a move that prevented other stations on the 
same satellite network from being removed from the airwaves as well . This action 
won the station praise from other networks and its watchers, fuelling the image of 
the station as sacrificing for others (Yadav 2005). 
Assessment: the effectiveness of countering al Manar 
Is banning al Manar and promoting an alternative likely to increase support for the 
US and its point of view'! Paradoxically, US actions in fact empowered al Manar 
as an alternative t~ US views and propaganda. Similarly, establishing Alhurra 
enhanced the credibility of Arab media, seen as airing uncomfortable truths so 
dangerous the US has taken the trouble to counter them (Cochrane 2004a) . Further, 
the widespread view that al Manar was banned due to pressure from Israel and 
pro-Israeli groups discredits the United States's proclaimed neutrality and its 
democratic values of press freedom. The effect is to reinforce the Arab sense of 
being 'besieged' by a global Israeli/American campaign (aljazeera.net 2005a). 
The head-on ideological assault represented by Alhurra has proved counter-
productive. The presence of the American station sets up a counterpoint and 
identifies particular views as clearly American, making rejection of those ideas 
clearer and adoption of alternative ideas more accepted. Alhurra adds to the sense 
of siege, legitimating the perception of being targeted by an American attempt 
against ideas, culture and values. Instead of entering the debate as desired, the US 
is adding fuel to it, arguably distracting the audience from the critical debate on 
government reform to take up a defensive position vis-a-vis the West. 
The effect of satellite television is not unidirectional - consuming American 
media does not translate into accepting that perspective. Arab audiences are 
critical viewers with long experience with state-owned media, censorship 
and propaganda. Hence they judge stations by the degree of separation from 
government, and triangulate multiple media sources according to their own pre-
existing beliefs and values (Centre for Strategic Studies 2005; Bishara 2004). As 
a result, a common viewing pattern is to flip between stations, comparing the 
coverage and perspectives, while keeping in mind the station's ideology. 
The plethora of media alternatives complicates the question of what Alhurra 
adds . The station was intended by the US government to cover new and difficult 
issues presumably avoided by other Arab stations. However, Marc Lynch's recent 
research demonstrates that such an assessment of Arab television is false. Indeed, 
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Arab satellite stations regularly cover difficult and presumably taboo subjects, 
including Islamist movements, torture in local prisons, censorship, corruption, 
women's rights, government repression. and economic problems such as 
unemployment and child exploitation (Rugh 2005). This new coverage is heavily 
focused on self-criticism of Arab society. 
Indeed. Alhurra cannot replace stations such as al Manar. The two offer 
differing symbols, messages and perspectives of what is important . In one, 
Israelis and Americans speak and act, they interpret news and events. rn the other, 
Palestinians, Lebanese and Iraqis have voice and agency. Al Manar promotes 
community identity, solidanty and a modest life-style; Alhurra demonstrates the 
extravagance of Western capitalism. Al Manar gives voice and pride to the victims, 
and shows victory against an enemy. Alhurra's interviews are from the point of 
view of that enemy. rubbing salt in the wound, as it were. One man stated that the 
station represents the moderate Muslim - not extreme, but focused on issues close 
to the average Muslim's heart. 
A better option than initiating new stations or banning existing ones is to engage 
the debate through existing media channels. Former Ambassador Rugh maintains 
that US officials should participate in existing stations, in effect entering the debate 
and creating dialogue among the players, not giving one-way monologues (Wise 
2005). By denouncing those stations as anti-American instead, the US is sending 
a message that free speech is only allowed when it is favourable to the US (Rugh 
2005). Some observers argue that for the lraqi elections to have an effect outside 
that country, they had to be viewed on al Jazeera, not Alhurra (Lynch 2005). 
rn fact, us policy has begun to embrace this policy alternative, with 
administration officials participating in Arab media such as al Jazeera (Weisman 
2005). Even more effective would be allowing lslamist groups opportunities 
for viable political participation. ln the end, this factor more than any other 
was responsible for Hizbullah 's emphasis on the domestic arena and al Manar 's 
moderation of its broadcasts (Baylouny 2004). 
Notes 
This research was undertaken with the aid of several (Arab) researchers watching al 
Manar between November- December 2004 and May-June 2005 in the United States, 
Lebanon. and Jordan . Alhurra was viewed in June 2005. Around 50 random street 
interviews were conducted in Lebanon and Jordan on both al Manar and Alhurra 
during June 2005. I supplemented this qualitative research with numerous surveys 
conducted on Arab media. 
2 I use the terms extremist and radical to describe. respectively. intolerant, rejectionist 
viewpoints and advocacy of the use of violence. 
3 On Hizbullah, see Hamzeh 2004, and Harb and Leenders 2005. 
4 The top four news stations, which capture 70-80 per cent of satellite viewers, are 
al Manar, al Jazeera, LBC' (Lebanese Broadcasting Company) and Abu Dhabi TV 
(Sharabi 2003). The majority of Palestinians watch three of these, excepting LBC 
(European Union Election Observation Mission 2005). Another poll found that for 
news on Palestine, Jordanians tum first to al Manar (28 per cent), then to al Jazeera 
(27.5 per cent\ (Jorisch 2004a). See also Jad 2002. 
79 
ANNE MAK.It:. U 1H L Vli" 1 
5 As a religious party, Hizbullah receives tithes ftom the Shi'a community. which in 
Islam constitute one-fifth of individual income. 
6 Interview, official at the Lebanese Ministry of Information, 24 June 2005; Figuie 
2005: 486 
7 interview, Lebanese Mimstry of Information. 
8 Interview Lebanese Ministry oflnformation. 
9 ln fact. ~me observers assert that the station 's broadcasts are crucial to the sustenance 
of the intifada (Fisk 2000). 
1 O The station's transliterated name should be aJ-Hurra, following conventional guidelines, 
since 'al-· is just 'the'. However, the station itself writes its name in transliteration as 
Alhurra. I follow their usage. . 
11 This includes the proposed expansion of Alhurra to European forums and the creation 
of a Farsi (Iranian) language satellite station (Wise 2005). 
12 An ACNeilsen and lpsos-Stat poll claimed that 34 per cent reported watched A.lhurra 
in the week before the survey. They were not asked how much they watched or.1fthey 
turned to the station during a crisis. This is particularly important given the v1ewmg 
characteristics of Arab audiences. who watch numerous channels for limited amounts 
of time each, complicating conclusions about viewer panems and ratings ( Sakr 1999: 
&-8). 








Radical Islam in Central Asia is in the midst of sweeping transformations . Despite 
the loss of their Afghan base, terror groups in the region are adapting and are 
mounting increasingly potent operations. This transformation has been in the 
making for some time. Over the past few years, Central Asia's terrorist groups 
have expanded their geographic reach and intensified their activities throughout 
much of the post-Soviet space. New alliances have also sprouted up. According 
to July 2004 testimony of the head of Tajikistan 's National Security Service, 
Tokon Mamytov, the IMU, Tajik and Kyrgyz fundamentalists and Uighurs from 
Western China's Xinjiang Autonomous Region have joined forces to create a 
new clandestine umbrella organization, the Islamic Movement of Central Asia. 
Its purported goal: the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate in Central Asia 
(Agoulnik and Kelly 2004). 
While regional experts agree that more has to be done to conquer religious 
extremism in Central Asia, they vary in identifying the direction, substance and 
form of anti-extremist activity. Some sympathize with Uzbek President Islam 
Karimov's brutal handling of the Andijan insurgency. Others prefer to engage 
the Islamists the Tajik way. There are those who see the main problem in an 
uncontrolled or a too controlled resurgence oflslam, and there are strong believers 
in social and economic progress as the only remedy. The recent series of 'orange 
revolutions' in post-Soviet space, including Kyrgyzstan, have led to yet another 
debate as to whether political liberalization presents opportunities or liabilities 
in fighting extremism and terrorism in Central Asia. The broad geopolitical 
scene of Central Asia remains complex and obscure. The great powers continue 
to compete more than cooperate in Central Asian affairs, thus enhancing the 
chances of extremist groups to capitalize on domestic shortcomings, mistrust 
between Central Asian regimes and incessant geopolitical ambition of powerful 
outsiders. 1 
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